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1 The framework of multiple realizability1
The key elements characterising the functionalist approach to mind studies2
are commonly identified (e.g. see [5]) with claims concerning:3
1. The cognitive creatures’ essential feature (they are all computational4
systems);5
2. The object of the research in the fields of cognitive psychology and6
artificial intelligence (abstract functional states and novel physical re-7
alizations for these states respectively);8
3. The irreducibility and consequently the autonomy of special sciences;9
4. The inefficacy of the empirical research on the neural structure, be-10
cause of the merely contingent relation established between the neural11
structure and the functional states it realizes.12
The objective of this paper is to support a reductionist perspective in13
mind studies, disputing the soundness of the claims 3 and 4 in particular.14
Therefore, since it is easy to concede that the theory of multiple realizability15
of mental states plays the role of the hub, binding all the four claims one16
another, this paper aims at showing the weaknesses of the grounds on which17
the theory has been built.18
The Multiple Realizability Theory (MRT) has been first formalized in the19
late sixties by Hilary Putnam in a famous series of papers (for a collection see20
[12]). In the article commonly recognised as the most representative of that21
period [11], it is assumed that every animal, independently of the species it22
belongs to, is capable of feeling pain: the mental state of pain is not species-23
specific. Therefore the identification of the mental state with a certain C-24
Fiber activation (or any other neural correlate) leads to the conclusion that25
all species should be found sharing the same neural structure and the same26
neural activation at the right moment. Even if we consider that parallel27
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evolution might lead to the same physical structure, once the argument is28
extended to other psychological predicates (such as, for instance, hunger or29
sexual attraction), it becomes overwhelmingly plausible (Putnam’s words)30
that these multiple realizations across species simply cannot be explained31
in terms of a theory grounded on the identity between mental and physical32
states. After all, even if parallel evolution could be proved in all known33
creatures, the conceivability of artificial silicon based systems capable of34
feeling pain, would definitively discard any attempt to establish an identity.35
Putnam’s famous proposal is then to conceive a different approach to the36
mind, grounding it on the concept of a virtual machine analogous to the37
Turing Machine, but characterised by a few strategic differences.38
It is useful to remind briefly what these devices are: a Turing machine
(TM) is a computational -serial- device that is instructed by a program
(set of instructions) to process a symbolic input in order to give a sym-
bolic output as a result. These processes may have the following schematic
representation:
{x1, x2, x3, ...xn} → A→ B → C → D → ...→ [final status]
The input assigns a value to each of the n variables {x1, x2, x3, ...xn}, then39
the virtual machine computes these values as it is described by its set of40
instructions, reaching its first state (A). The new state gives life to a new41
series of processes that allows the machine to change again state in favour42
of the second one (B): the operation is replicated until the virtual machine43
reaches the final state described by the instructions in relation to the values44
assigned to the variables.45
This mechanism implies that a TM is characterised by an assignment of46
probabilities 1 or 0 to every transition. On the contrary, if the instructions47
allow the machine to change its status from the original one to a series48
of target ones, with probabilities assigned to each of them, (e.g. starting49
from the functional state A the machine may change in favour of B with50
30% of chances or C with 70%) then the machine is called Probabilistic51
Automaton. Finally, there are devices capable of processing sets of inputs52
in order to generate new sets of instructions: this ability allows simulating53
any possible TM generating a so-called Universal Turing Machine (UTM). In54
other words, the UTM is directly programmed by the input, which instructs55
the machine about the processes to apply thenceforth. The MRT assumes56
that the combination between a probabilistic automaton and a UTM gives57
in return a virtual device whose processes are consistent with the living58
beings’ ones.59
All these devices (TM, UTM and probabilistic automaton) are known60
as virtual machines because of their nature which makes them completely61
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independent of any specific physical structure: it doesn’t matter if the com-62
putation required by the set of instructions is performed by a neural system,63
a CPU or a series of cogs wheels. The focus is on the functional organization64
realized by the device (i.e. the instructions concerning its state transitions)65
and the functional state it can consequently reach, once the device has re-66
ceived a specific symbolic input. Furthermore, since the states are also67
independent, it is not even necessary for two systems to be functionally68
isomorphic (i.e. it is not necessary that they realize the same set of instruc-69
tions) to reach the same state: different programs may lead to the same70
functional state.71
In conclusion, the MRT entails that two generic neural structures A and72
B may realize a mental state M, but they can never be identified with73
the mental state itself: the relation between the physical system and its74
mental realizations is always contingent and there can be infinite physically75
different systems realizing the same mental state. The focus changes from76
the reductionist study of the neural correlate to the functionalist study of77
the realized functions1.78
Putnam’s early argument has been originally applied to different neural79
structures belonging to different species, but few years later Jerry Fodor80
[7, 8] generalised the value of the MRT, presenting his assumption as the81
necessary consequence of Putnam’s conclusions. The generalised version of82
the MRT has started appealing to the 70s studies on brain mapping and to83
the notions of neural degeneracy and plasticity: the key argument coming84
from these studies is that the nervous system of higher organisms is able to85
accomplish a single psychological task in a wide variety of ways by means86
of several neurological parts of the whole structure. As a consequence,87
the relation between physical and mental states proves to be contingent88
even when it is applied to the same species or a single neural system2:89
time becomes a legitimate variable to take into account when considering90
the contingency of the causal relation between the physical system (the91
implementer) and the functional state (the implemented).92
2 The computability issue and the overestimation of93
the UTM94
The superimposition of the processes performed by a virtual machine on95
the ones realized by cognitive organisms has been attractive since the very96
1Subsequent articles (e.g. see [2] or i [12, §14]) have also dealt with the problem of
the realization of more than a single functional state (or psychological predicate) at the
same time. The solution proposed assumes complex living beings are able of realizing
the processes of several virtual machines at the same time (i.e. in parallel).
2E.g. a single human being realizes the same mental state of pain during childhood
and adulthood, despite the differences characterising the same neural structure in the
two periods.
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beginning: even those who have tried to discard the functionalist approach97
have rarely questioned the argument of the multiple realizations of mental98
states and have preferred to focus their attention on the implications the99
theory has on reductionism [5, 9, 10, 4]. A few exceptions are represented100
by those [17, 15, 1] who have challenged the likelihood of the argument101
by means of theoretical reasoning or stressing the failures of the predic-102
tions implied the generalised MRT. Nonetheless, I think a computational103
approach to this matter has been surprisingly ignored: the theory relies on104
the identification of the mind with the TM; should this identification be105
computationally inadequate, the MRT would be proved ill-grounded. As a106
matter of fact, there are three reasons that lead to this conclusion.107
The first reason is the limited range of Turing-computable algorithms. To108
put it simple, the computational capacities of a TM are widely overestimated109
and they are usually erroneously attributed to Turing himself. There is a110
huge list of philosophical misconceptions about Turing’s virtual machine [6]111
and they are all grounded on the erroneous assumption that in his articles112
Turing may have mathematically demonstrated how a UTM can compute113
any algorithm (i.e. the mathematical function that formally describes the114
set of instructions or program of the virtual machine) performed by any115
other machine with any architecture, given enough time and memory.116
What Turing did demonstrate is that a UTM can realize any algorithm117
characterised by the following requirements (which define the ’mechanical118
method’):119
1. finite number of exact instructions (each instruction expressed with120
a finite number of symbols) to make the machine change from one121
functional state to the following one.122
2. Finite number of state transitions to produce the expected result.123
3. In principle, a human being can carry it out only aided by paper and124
pencil.125
4. It does not require insight or ingenuity to be carried out3.126
For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient to point out that the set of127
hypothetic algorithms realized by any TM is countable, that is to say, it is128
characterized by the same order of infinite of the integers. On the contrary,129
the number of all the hypothetic computable algorithms is uncountable (i.e.130
of a higher order of infinite): hence, there is an infinite number of algorithms131
3These notions have a formal and rigourous equivalent[16, 3]: for the purpose of this
paper it is sufficient to refer to their informal version.
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which have a mathematical description and cannot be realized by a UTM,132
even if they are realized by differently structured systems.133
If the algorithms implemented by neural systems are not found to meet at134
least one of the four requirements for Turing-computability, it must be con-135
cluded that a UTM may not simulate or even describe information processes136
in living beings. Consequently, it is necessary to study the way biological137
neural systems process their data, before formulating any hypothesis about138
the possibility to realize such processes by means of a virtual machine. Un-139
der these circumstances, the hypothesis of multiple realizations of mental140
processes may be empirically falsified: MRT cannot be established a priori.141
It may be argued that even if we could find out that neural systems do142
not realize Turing-computable algorithms, this finding by itself would not143
be enough to discard multiple realizability. A new hypothetical and more144
powerful virtual machine might be conceived: different from the known Tur-145
ing machines, it might widen the range of realizable algorithms, overcoming146
some of, if not all, the weak points of the classic machines.147
Nonetheless, it seems that such a powerful virtual machine is unlikely to148
come and it is usually considered mathematically implausible4. Even if it149
were plausible, this objection would not lead far from the prospected path:150
these new hypothetic systems would not be asked to simulate a generic151
new set of algorithms but those specific of the parallel distributed -neural-152
systems. Once again, in order to be sure that the proper set of algorithms153
is part of the domain of these new machines (proving the soundness of154
MRT), it would be necessary to know beforehand what sort of algorithms155
are implemented by neural systems.156
This conclusion leads to the second reasoning against the plausibility of157
the MRT. There is a particular causal relation between the physical struc-158
ture of a neural system and the algorithm it implements: a neural network159
realizes a sheaf of sets of mathematical functions5 defined by its architecture160
and by the computation performed by each single node of the network. The161
values assigned to the other variables, such as the weights of the synapses162
4The existence and the features of devices that may result to be able to implement
such Turing-incomputable algorithms have been debated at least for five decades. An
essential bibliography and a brief account of this debate can be found in section two of
the cited Copeland’s article [6]. As a matter of fact, the probabilistic automaton already
represents a virtual machine which is able to realize a wider set of algorithms, if compared
to a TM. I mainly refer to the TM for the convenience of the reasoning, but the criticism
is valid for the probabilistic automaton as well: the set of algorithms realized is still
countable and the algorithms themselves are characterized by similar features.
5E.g. the equation ( ax + by = k) describes a sheaf of straight lines. If we fix the
constants (in this case: a, b, k) attributing them a value, the result is the equation of a
single straight line (e.g. 2x + 3y = 1). A set of straight lines describes the equations
combined in single or multiple systems.
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(i.e. the electrochemical conductibility of the synapses), fix the constants163
for any specific set of algorithms within this sheaf. Every modification in164
the architecture of the network or in the processes of the single nodes leads165
to a system that can or cannot solve a specific given task6.166
If we use simple connectionist models, the sheaf of algorithms imple-167
mented can be mathematically described with ease: in these conditions, the168
analysis of the relation between the neural structure and the implemented169
algorithm makes us conclude that the former has a causal influence on the170
latter. Nonetheless, even if the systems show a higher order of complex-171
ity (such as those proper of biological networks), it is possible to have an172
idea of the sheaf of algorithms determined by the architecture, especially173
considering that, though extremely complex, single neurons compute their174
electrochemical signals in a way that can be described by adequate mathe-175
matical functions. In a few words, different neural systems realize different176
algorithms, require different amount of energy and time to perform the177
same task and -due to differences in vector conversion- differ in the way the178
information is encoded or stored, in the categories developed and in their179
resistance to physical damages. Thus, mathematical analysis of neural sys-180
tems is telling us a different story from the one told by the MRT: in order181
to be able to process information -precisely- in the same way, two neural182
systems must be physically identical (i.e. two biological neural systems can183
hardly ever be functionally isomorphic due to the known structural differ-184
ences across species and within the same one).185
It is still possible to claim that whether or not two neural systems may186
perfectly match their processes implementing the same algorithm, this would187
not affect the hypothesis that a serial device may be conceived realizing neu-188
ral processes. Once a probabilistic automaton were shown simulating the189
information processes of a neural system, the possibility to separate single190
states in the virtual machine would make it irrelevant for the MRT the191
whole second reasoning. Yet, the problem with this criticism is that it does192
not consider both the arguments so far described at the same time:193
A. Whether or not a virtual machine may realize the set of instructions194
implemented by a neural system can only be established a posteriori.195
B. The physical structure in neural systems is directly responsible for the196
processes implemented.197
The two premises A and B lead inevitably to:198
6The logical operator XOR is often cited in literature: it is known that there is no
way to realize this computation with a single layer neural network (e.g. see [14, chap.
19, sect. 3].
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C. In order to support an anti-reductionist path (MRT), it is necessary199
to use a reductionist strategy, seeking the knowledge concerning the200
processes realized by a neural system.201
When everything is taken into consideration, the proof in favour of the202
multiple realizability of the mental states would be reached after it had203
become irrelevant.204
The third reason against the plausibility of the MRT is grounded on205
the computational inadequacy of serial systems in simulating the unique206
features of biological neural systems. Biological systems deal with contin-207
uous and infinite inputs, processes and outputs, processing information in208
a flow; on the contrary, a virtual machine necessarily works with discrete209
and finite data and state transitions, following a step-by-step procedure.210
External data can reprogram a UTM to make it change its processes (once211
the input has changed the set of instructions, the device can also apply its212
rules to previously incomputable data), but the neural systems are able to213
change their processes both depending on and independently of the input.214
For instance, biological systems based on neural structures require a specific215
amount of energies in order to activate their systems: a lack of energy mod-216
ifies the computational processes by means of a change in the computation217
performed in the single neurons of the network. This change takes place218
independently of both the awareness and the perception of such a lack in219
the organism This feature is not limited to the energy requirements: any220
physical alteration7 directly modifies the way the information is processed221
by the system, but cannot be considered as part of the input.222
A simulation with a Universal Turing machine can hardly give an account223
of these phenomena, despite the fact that they are very frequent in all224
living beings based on neural systems. Interestingly, Fodor [7] has used the225
argument of plasticity and degeneracy to propose his generalised version226
of the theory, but I think that this argument can be of use also against227
the virtual machine hypothesis, at least until these systems will be able to228
realize algorithms which can only be reprogrammed by input information.229
Lastly, such differences make the parallel neural systems more robust230
in respect of time and energy requirements: if the processes are suddenly231
interrupted due to a lack of time, these systems are still able to give an232
output, even if it will probably differ from the one the system would have233
reached having sufficient amount of time. On the contrary, the mechanical234
method implies that a serial system needs to follow all the given instructions235
7E.g. structural damages or any other alteration of the neural architecture, chemical
or electrical interference in electrochemical synapses, modification of the metabolic state
of the neurons, etc.
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in order to perform its transition among states: the lack of the time required236
to accomplish it would cause a failure in giving an output.237
3 Making it through the MRT238
It may be argued that it is here discussed the multiple realization of a239
whole set of instructions, but the object of the MRT is a single, indepen-240
dent and isolated functional state, which has its equivalent in the mental241
state/psychological predicate of a living being. Nonetheless, the supposed242
isolation of single psychological predicates such as pain, hunger, etc. is ac-243
ceptable within the context of the known virtual machines, such as the UTM244
and the probabilistic automaton: these machines are characterised by serial245
processes and therefore allow the existence of autonomous functional states.246
Once the identification of the mind with virtual machines is disputed, the247
existence of states of this sort in the mind is challenged too: our self-beliefs248
about them may be misleading.249
Let us push this line of thought a little farther. This article has outlined250
the following proportion:251
Set of instruction: Turing machine = algorithm: system whose processes252
are mathematically describable253
It may be argued that this proportion implies the following:254
Functional state: Turing machine = assignation of values to all variables255
in the algorithm: system whose processes are mathematically describable256
In the set of parallel neural systems (which is a subset of the mathemat-257
ically describable systems), this proportion would imply that a particular258
kind of activation pattern would take the place of the third term in the259
second proportion. Though different from the ’C-nerve activation’ correctly260
defined as philosopher’s fiction[1], this would be anyway a completely theo-261
retical object: a sort of photography of the entire structure, taking into ac-262
count the whole network, the activation and metabolic status of all neurons263
and the disposition of every synapse to propagate its signals. Consequently,264
any change in any of the variables involved, would generate a different assig-265
nation to the variables as well as a different mental state, a conclusion that266
may seem to lead to an unusable theoretical object.267
The problem is that biological neural networks are dynamical informa-268
tion processing systems, and consequently this perspective brings forth the269
concept of a theoretical object (the photography of the whole structure)270
characterised by an unavoidable incoherence. If the new definitions imply271
a concept of mental state which is both unusable and incoherent, then it272
seems it would be a good idea to discard the whole thesis, on the basis of273
its implications.274
I think this is not a good reasoning: an analogy with the field of analysis275
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in mathematics should help in this case. A sheaf of straight lines can be276
studied both independently of the assignations of values to its constants and277
after the partial or complete assignation of the same values; the variables278
also contribute to locate specific parts or single points on the line analysed.279
As a consequence, it is perfectly plausible to imagine general rules that can280
be applied to parallel neural systems (e.g. the computation performed by281
a single neuron is almost the same in every organism showing a central or282
distributed neural system: this is the assignation of value to a constant),283
other rules that are species specific (the macro structure of the neural net-284
work shows its similarities) and finally those rules which are single-structure285
specific and vary within a single organism depending on its natural devel-286
opment, experience and accidents. The use of the fine and coarse grain of287
analysis [1], should make it possible to relate the new born theoretical men-288
tal states — indeed a dynamic concept, far from the static serial equivalent,289
but still usable- to the variances here described across species or within the290
single organism.291
This use of the mathematical descriptions does not lead to a hyper local292
reductionism: the single events in the flow of continuous processes of the293
system are still comparable within the same species with an acceptable fine294
grain of analysis and the tool that allows such a comparison relies again295
in the mathematical description of the algorithms realised by the neural296
processes. Furthermore, there are many advantages in pursuing the use of297
this tool to understand mind processes. The algorithms describe the way298
every possible signal is computed by a system: they are not influenced by299
the presence of a specific stimulus or a combination of stimuli, neither they300
rely on the analysis of visible behaviours or other forms of output. As301
it was originally conceived by Putnam concerning the set of instructions302
of a probabilistic automaton, the specific study of the algorithms imple-303
mented by neural system would allow to describe every possible process304
these system perform in each of their layers, reaching important results in305
the understanding of the observable and hidden phenomena8.306
4 Conclusions307
This paper states a methodological problem. There is no computational308
device able to realize all the uncountable possible algorithms: as a conse-309
quence, if the object of mind studies are the psychological predicates, it is310
necessary to study the specific processes that generate them. Whether or311
not these will result to be multiply realized, the computational study of312
8Along this path, the main obstacle is represented by the epistemic indeterminacy due
to the order of complexity of the biological neural systems, but I assume that grounding
the models on the findings in neuroscience, a better explanatory value will be granted.
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neural structures is the necessary first step of a realistic approach to the313
mind. Furthermore, contrary to what expected by the MRT, the more sci-314
ence gives us tools to investigate neural systems, the more it seems that the315
processes they implement are supervened by the physical matter and are316
characterised by a series of unique features.317
Whenever the processes realized by a particular system are inaccessible,318
the only way to attempt an analysis consists in assuming that another sys-319
tem, whose processes are accessible, is realizing some of the processes of the320
first inaccessible system. This procedure creates a useful analogy allowing321
an analysis narrowed to a part of the whole set of processes of the acces-322
sible system: as a consequence, the new aimed description is partial and323
indirect, because it refers to the supposed analogous system rather than to324
the original one.325
My claim is that when multiple realizability is applied to neural systems,326
it is useful to conceive it as a tool giving access to incomplete descriptions of327
the psychological predicates: a similar constraint does not entail to discard328
the procedure as a whole, because there are still cases in which there is no or329
little access to complete descriptions. Nevertheless, if a complete description330
is accessible or if a better analogy is established (due to an accessible system331
which is closer to the unaccessible one), then the new description must be332
preferred to the partial one formerly achieved. In the field of mind studies,333
in the past few years, the mental processes are becoming more and more334
accessible and consequently new descriptions will be formalized thanks to335
this change: on this new ground, new explanatory theories will be built,336
showing substantial divergence if compared with the ones formerly inferred337
on the ground of the MRT.338
In the attempt to save the MRT from Shapiro’s remarks [15], Rosenberg339
has stated that this theory has been proposed to explain the absence of dis-340
coverable psychophysical laws in a way compatible with physicalism[13]. It341
seems today that we are moving towards the finding of these laws: should342
this happen by means of the mathematical description of the processes re-343
alised by the neural systems, the prediction here supported is that the mul-344
tiple realizability tool will see the fields it has been applied so far restrained,345
in favour of the new tools.346
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